Transactionalization of EU Competition Law by Mattioli, Evi
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3040306 
TILEC Discussion Paper
TILEC
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3040306 
1 
 
The Transactionalization of EU Competition Law: A Positive Development? 
 





Over the last few years, a growing number of competition law investigations launched by the 
Commission end with the adoption of a commitments or, in the case of cartels, settlement decision. 
The success of these procedures is explained by the benefits they bring to both the Commission 
and the investigated undertakings. These procedures allow the Commission to save resources and 
obtain results quickly, while they allow undertakings to avoid the imposition of a fine (in the case 
commitments) or a decrease of the fine (in the case of settlements), as well as end the distraction 
created by investigation and control the damage to their reputation. This paper argues that 
excessive reliance on these procedures may have some downsides in that they may be poorly suited 
to deal with cases involving complex and novel questions of competition law. Moreover, in the 
case of commitments, there is a danger that this procedure by the Commission be used to extract 
remedies that it may not be able to include in an infringement decision subject to judicial review. 
As these procedures generate few appeals, there is also a danger that these procedures undermine 
the evolution of the case-law. 
 
Keywords: competition law, commitments, settlements, cartels, remedies, judicial review, 
procedural. 
 




One of the most significant developments in EU competition law in the past decade is the growing 
opportunity given to undertakings investigated by the European Commission (the “Commission”) 
to bring the matter formally to an end by offering commitments (in cases involving Article 101 
and/or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”))1 or by negotiating 
                                                 
(*)  Professor of Competition Law & Economics and member of the Tilburg Law & Economics Center (TILEC) at 
Tilburg University; visiting Professor of Law, University College London; and partner at EUCLID Law, 
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1  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ [2003] L1/1 (‘Regulation 1/2003’), Article 9. 
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a settlement (in the case of cartels).2 As per Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, undertakings “can 
offer commitments to meet the competition concerns addressed to them by the Commission.” If 
the Commission accepts the proposed commitments, it may by decision make them binding, 
without a fine being imposed. Under the cartel settlement procedure, the undertakings concerned 
can acknowledge their participation and liability in a cartel in exchange for a reduction of the fine 
that would otherwise be imposed on them.  
 
These procedures have been abundantly used by undertakings. For instance, since 2004, the 
Commission adopted 22 commitments decisions in cases involving Article 102 TFEU (compared 
to 9 infringement decisions). It has also adopted 22 commitments decisions involving Article 101 
TFEU, and 1 decision involving Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Since 2010, the Commission has 
also adopted 24 cartel settlements (compared to 21 infringement decisions during the same period). 
Clearly, commitments decisions and cartel settlements have become extremely popular tools, 
probably more so than one could have anticipated when these instruments were adopted.  
 
While the commitments and settlements procedures offer significant advantages, this paper argues 
that excessive reliance on these procedures may have some downsides. First, these procedures may 
be poorly suited to deal with cases involving complex and novel questions of competition law, and 
where guidance is needed. Moreover, in the case of commitments, there is a danger that this 
procedure by the Commission be used to extract remedies that it may not be able to include in an 
infringement decision subject to judicial review. As these procedures generate few appeals, there 
is also a danger that these procedures undermine the role of the EU courts, as well as the evolution 
of the case-law. 
 
Against this background, this paper is divided in four parts. Part II provides statistics over the use 
of the commitments and settlement procedures, and explains the reasons why these procedures 
have been so successful. Part III discusses whether the extensive use of the commitments and 








                                                 
2  Commission Regulation (EC) No 622/2008 of 30 June 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 773/2004, as 
regards the conduct of settlement procedures in cartel cases, OJ [2008] L171/3 and Commission Notice on the 
conduct of settlement procedures in view of the adoption of Decisions pursuant to Article 7 and Article 23 of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in cartel cases, OJ [2008] C167/1 (‘Settlement Notice’). 
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II. Reasons explaining the success of the commitments and cartel settlement 
procedures 
 
Both the commitments and settlement procedures were introduced by the Commission to 
streamline the administrative procedure and to save resources.3 Efficiency considerations were 
thus at the core of the introduction of the procedures in the Commission’s tool box. These 
procedures also offered significant benefits to undertakings subject to investigations 
(“undertakings concerned”) and are thus part of the strategy used by undertakings to end 




The commitments procedure allows the Commission to save significant resources compared to the 
procedure leading to an infringement decision. First, the Commission can communicate its 
competition concerns in a shorter and less detailed Preliminary Assessment (“PA”).4 The 
Statement of Objections (“SO”) prepared by the Commission in the context of an infringement 
procedure contains a detailed assessment of the facts of the case by the Commission, while the PA 
in principle contains summary references to the main evidence of the alleged infringement. The 
PA is around twenty pages, which is relatively short compared to the typical SO, which in a 
complex case can run over several hundred pages.5 Second, a commitments decision is 
significantly shorter than an infringement decision, in terms of pages and substantive analysis. The 
Commission is not required to establish an infringement of competition law and in principle limits 
its analysis to a brief discussion of its competition concerns. Besides the reduced amount of 
drafting, the commitments procedure allows the Commission to achieve quick results, which may 
be an important benefit in cases involving fast-moving industries, and it decreases the likelihood 
of an appeal.  
 
As far as undertakings are concerned, the most attractive feature of the commitments procedure is 
that it allows them to escape fines, the level of which significantly increased in the last twenty 
                                                 
3  Settlement Notice, para. 1. See also Commission Staff Working Paper – Report on the functioning of 
Regulation 1/2003 (COM(2009)206), §94 and 132. 
4 It must be submitted however that in practice, still nearly 40% of the commitments procedures have been 
opened by SO. 
5  E. Gippini-Fournier, “The Modernisation of European Competition Law: First Experiences with Regulation 
1/2003”, Community Report to the FIDE Congress 2008, 35, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1139776. According to Gippini-Fournier, the 
'preliminary assessment' is "reminiscent of the 'warning letters' sent by the Directorate-General for 
competition, with the significant difference that preliminary assessments are adopted by the Commission by 
the same procedure used for statements of objections". 
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years.6 Commitments shorten the length of the procedure (and thus the internal and external 
resources needed to fight the case), reduce managerial distraction linked to the investigation and 
reduce the damage to the undertakings’ reputation. There is less “stigma” attached to a 
commitments decision and it does not “count” for recidivism purposes. Finally, because of their 
streamlined nature and the fact they do not establish an infringement, commitments decisions may 
reduce the risk of damages actions.  
 
These advantages explain the popularity of commitments decisions, both in Article 101 and 102 
TFEU investigations as illustrated by the tables below. Clearly, but for cartel cases, commitments 
decisions have become the most common procedure to bring Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
investigations to an end. 
 
Table 1 
Commitments decisions / Article 101 TFEU 
Reference Date Type of infringement Appeal 
37.398 - UEFA 23.07.03 Joint selling agreement (horizontal)  
37.214 - Bundesliga  19.01.05 Joint selling agreement (horizontal)  
38.173 - FA Premier League 22.03.06 Joint selling agreement (horizontal)  
38.348 - Repsol 12.04.06 Non-compete (vertical) T-45/08; C-36/09 P* 
38.681 - Cannes Extension 04.10.06 Collective management of rights (horizontal)  
39.143 - Opel 13.09.07 Access to technical information (vertical)  
39.142 - Toyota 13.09.07 Access to technical information (vertical)  
39.141 - FIAT 13.09.07 Access to technical information (vertical)  
39.140 - DaimlerChrysler 13.09.07 Access to technical information (vertical)  
39.416 - Ship classification 14.10.09 Standard-setting (horizontal)  
39.596 - BA/AA/IB 14.07.10 Airline alliance (horizontal)  
39.398 - Visa I 08.12.10 Joint setting of MIFs (horizontal)  
39.736 - Siemens/Areva 18.06.12 Non-compete (vertical)  
39.847 – e-books I 18.06.12 Hub-and-spoke  
39.230 - Rio Tinto Alcan 20.12.12 Tying/Bundling**  
39.595 - A++ 23.05.13 Airline alliance (horizontal)  
39.847 – e-books II 25.07.13 Hub-and-spoke  
39.398 - Visa II 12.05.15 Joint setting of MIFs   
39.964 - Skyteam 12.05.15 Airline alliance (horizontal)  
39.850 - Container liner 
shipping 
07.07.16 Container liner shipping (horizontal)  
39.745 - ISDA 20.07.16 Refusal to license  
39.745 - Markit 20.07.16 Refusal to license  
40.023 - Paramount 26.07.16 Geo-blocking  
*Appeal by third party 
**Proceedings both under Article 101 and Article 102 TFEU 
 
 
                                                 
6  For the statistics, see ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf. See also R. Sauer, "Public 
sanctions. Public Enforcer" in F. Wijckmans and F. Tuytschaever (eds.), Horizontal agreements and cartels in 




Commitments decisions / Article 102 TFEU 
Reference Date Type of infringement Appeal 
39.116 - Coca-Cola 22.06.05 Exclusivity and rebates   
38.381 - De Beers 22.02.06 Exclusivity T-170/06; C-441/07 
P* 
37.966 - Distrigaz 11.10.07 Long-term supply contracts  
39.388 - GEWM (E.ON 
electricity) 
26.11.08 Inflating balancing costs  
39.389 - GEBM (E.ON 
electricity) 
26.11.08 Export restrictions   
39.402 - RWE 18.03.09 Refusal to supply / Margin squeeze  
39.316 - GDF 03.12.09 Refusal to supply  
38.636 - Rambus 09.12.09 Excessive pricing  
39.530 - Microsoft 16.12.09 Tying/Bundling  
39.386 - EDF 17.03.10 Long-term supply contracts  
39.351 - SvK 14.04.10 Discrimination  
39.317 - E.ON 04.05.10 Refusal to supply  
39.315 - ENI 29.09.10 Capacity hoarding and degradation / Strategic 
underinvestment 
 
39.592 - S&P 15.11.11 Excessive pricing  
39.692 - IBM 13.12.11 Refusal to supply  
39.654 – Thomson Reuters 20.12.12 Refusal to supply T-76/14* 
39.230 - Rio Tinto Alcan 20.12.12 Tying/Bundling**  
39.727 - CEZ 10.04.13 Capacity hoarding  
39.678 - Deutsche Bahn I 18.12.13 Margin Squeeze  
39.731 - Deutsche Bahn II 18.12.13 Margin Squeeze  
39.939 - Samsung 9.04.14 Seeking of injunctions (SEPs)  
39.767 - BEH 10.12.15 Territorial restrictions on resale  
40.153 - Amazon 04.05.17 Abusive contractual clauses  
*Appeal by third party 




The settlement procedure similarly provides significant procedural gains for the Commission. In 
order to reach a settlement with the Commission, the undertakings concerned have to acknowledge 
their liability for the infringement and refrain from requesting access to the file and an oral 
hearing.7 Moreover, the Commission only needs to issue an SO that reflects the settlement 
submissions of the undertakings,8 which is considerably shorter than the SO in the infringement 
procedure.9 Settlement submissions of the undertakings concerned contain an acknowledgment of 
                                                 
7  Settlement Notice, para. 20. 
8  Settlement Notice, paras. 22 and 23, fn 1. An exception is the Trucks case where the undertakings concerned 
approached the Commission informally to request settlement discussions. The Commission started the 
settlement procedure, while the undertakings concerned at that point in the proceedings already received a 
regular SO and have had access to the complete file of the Commission. 
9  F. Laina and E. Laurinen, “The EU Cartel Settlement Procedure: Current Status and Challenges”, (2013) 4(4) 
Journal of European Competition Law and Practice 305. 
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participation in the cartel and of an infringement, an indication of the maximum amount of the fine 
they are willing to accept, the confirmation that the undertakings have been sufficiently informed 
by the objections of the Commission and that they will not request access to file or an oral 
hearing.10 The undertakings must provide a short reply to the SO within two weeks, which will 
simply confirm that the SO reflects the settlement submissions.11 As in the case of commitments, 
the reduced likelihood of a subsequent appeal constitutes another advantage for the Commission.  
 
Although the cartel settlement procedure only grants a 10% reduction on the fine that would 
otherwise have been imposed by the Commission, it offers undertakings benefits comparable to 
those offered by commitments decisions, such as reduced legal costs and reputational damage,12 
and fewer distractions from conducting their business. Settlements also reduce the amount of 
publicly available information to potential damage claimants. Moreover, it is not excluded that de 
facto the reward for settling is higher than the 10% contemplated by the Settlement Notice as the 
settlement procedure allows for more meaningful and transparent discussions with the 
Commission than under a standard cartel procedure. Although this is speculative, these discussions 
potentially increase the ability of the undertakings concerned to influence the Commission on 
elements that are taken into account in the calculation of the fine (e.g., the duration of the 
infringement, the sales involved, etc.). 
 
The popularity of the settlement procedure is reflected in the number of settlement decisions. Since 
2010 the Commission has adopted 24 settlement decisions as compared to 21 regular prohibition 
decisions adopted in the same timeframe. Since the adoption of the first settlement decision, the 
settlement procedure has been applied in more than 50% of the prohibition decisions. The 
importance of the settlements is increasing and recent years show particularly high ratio of the 
settlements, namely 80% in 2014 and 60% in 2016.13   
 
Table 3 
Reference Date Number of 
undertakings involved 
Fine Appeal 
39.511 - DRAMs 19.05.10 10 € 331,273,800  
38.866 - Animal feed 
phosphates 
20.07.10 5 (+ 1 non-settling) € 175,647,000 T-456/10; 
C-411/15P* 
                                                 
10  Settlement Notice, para. 20. 
11  Settlement Notice, para. 26. 
12  Cartel infringements are stigmatized, and presented and perceived as a serious form of consumer abuse. The 
willingness of undertaking to cooperate and admit their liability may limit the stigma linked to such 
infringements. 
13  D. Geradin and K. Sadrak, “The EU Competition Law Fining System: A Quantitative Review of the 




39.579 – Laundry powder 
detergents 
13.04.11 3 € 315,200,000  
39.605 - CRT glass bulbs 19.10.11 4 € 128,736,000  
39.600 - Refrigeration 
processors 
07.12.11 5 € 161,198,000  
39.611 - Water management 
products 
01.11.12 3 € 13,661,000  
39.748 - Automotive Wire 
harnesses 
10.07.13 5 € 141,791,000  
39.914 - Euro rate derivatives 04.12.13 6 (+ 1 non-settling) € 1,042,749,000 T-98/14; T-113/17* 
T-611/15** 
39.861 - Yen rate derivatives 04.12.13 4 (+ 3 non-settling) € 669,719,000 T-180/15* 
39.801 - Polyurethane foam 
mattresses 
29.01.14 4 € 114,077,000  
39.952 - Power exchanges 05.03.14 2 € 5,979,000  
39.922 - Automotive bearings 19.03.14 6 € 953,306,000  
39.792 - Steel abrasives 02.04.14 4 (+ 3 non-settling) € 30,707,000 T-433/16* 
39.965 - Canned mushrooms 25.06.14 3 (+ 1 non-settling) € 32,225,000  
39.924 - SIRD (Libor) 21.10.14 2 € 61,676,000  
39.924 - SIRD (Bid ask spread) 21.10.14 4 € 32,355,000  
39.780 - Envelopes 11.12.14 5 € 19,485,000 T-95/15 
40.055 - Parking heathers 17.06.15 2 € 68,175,000  
40.098 - Blocktrains 15.07.15 3 € 49,154,000  
40.028 - Alternators and starters 27.01.16 3 € 137,789,000  
39.824 - Truck producers 19.07.16 5 (hybrid) € 2,926,499,000  
39.904 - Rechargeable batteries 12.12.16 4 € 165,841,000  
39.960 - Thermal systems 08.03.17 6 € 155,575,000  
40.013 - Car lighting 21.06.17 3 € 26,744,000  
* Appeal by non-settling party 
**Appeal by third party 
 
III. Are commitments decisions and cartel settlements too much of a good thing? 
 
While it is hard to deny the advantages of the commitments and the settlement procedures, their 
extensive use raises the question of whether they are not too much of a good thing. As we argue 
hereafter, this depends. We first observe the significant decline of the number of appeals before 
the General Court of the EU (“GCEU”) in the past few years, which largely corresponds to the 
increased reliance by the Commission on commitments and settlement decisions. While a 
reduction in the number of appeals may not necessarily be a problem in itself as some appeals have 
limited merits, it is however important that decisions involving complex and/or novel questions of 
law be subject to judicial review. In this respect, we are concerned that in certain cases, more 
particularly in commitments decisions, the Commission uses the reduced risk of appeals by the 






A. A review of the data on the reduction of the number of appeals of Commission 
decisions to the EU Courts 
An analysis of the number of appeals filed against competition decisions adopted by the 
Commission since 2000 shows a downward trend since 2011, with a significant drop in 2015 and 
2016. While the average number of appeals for the period 2000-2010 was 54, the average number 
for the period 2011-2016 is 29. While several factors may be at play, a review of the appeals 
against commitments and settlement decisions shows that these decisions are rarely appealed by 
the undertakings concerned, and thus – given the number of such decisions adopted by the 




Source: Annual reports of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
 
Our analysis shows that none of the undertakings subject to a commitments decision have appealed 
the Commission decision. In three cases, however, a third-party did bring an appeal before the 
GCEU.14 These appeals were based on an alleged infringement of essential procedural 
requirements. In its Alrosa judgment, the CJEU limited the application of the principle of 
proportionality to the commitments vis-à-vis third-parties, thereby confirming the Commission’s 
wide margin of discretion in these cases.15 Consequently, the responsibility for avoiding 
disproportionate commitment decisions will lay in the first place with the undertakings concerned. 
It is for them to refuse commitments that go beyond what is required to solve the competitive 
concerns raised and to offer alternative, less onerous remedies. Whether undertakings can resist 
                                                 
14  Judgment of 17 July 2007, Alrosa v Commission, T-170/06, EU:T:2007:220 (in appeal: Judgment of 29 June 
2010, Alrosa v Commission, Case C-441/07 P, EU:C:2010:3779); Judgment of 15 September 2016 in 
Morningstar v Commission, T-76/14, EU:T:2016:48; Order of 14 November 2008 in Transportes Evaristo 
Molina v Commission, T-45/08, EU:T:2008:499 (upheld in judgment of 11 November 2010, Transportes 
Evaristo Molina v Commission, C-36/09 P, EU:C:2010:670). 
15  In the Morningstar judgment, the GC followed the approach of the CJEU. See Judgment of 15 September 2016 















offering disproportionate commitments when the alternative is a large fine is, however, 
questionable. 
 
As far as settlement decisions are concerned, only two settling parties have appealed such decisions 
so far, while a total number of 101 undertakings were fined under the settlement procedure. The 
appeal that resulted in a judgment was based only on an alleged infringement of essential 
procedural requirements in relation to the determination of the amount of the fine.16 The GCEU 
annulled the fine due to the Commission's failure to state reasons.17 In four of the six hybrid 
settlement cases, a non-settling party appealed the infringement decision. All these appeals were 
based on both alleged misapplication of the law or on procedural grounds.18 The incentive to appeal 
– and the possible grounds for appeal – thus appears to be significantly lower with settling 
undertakings. 
 
While the GCEU was very much seen when it was created as a competition law court, the CJEU 
is in fact handling almost as many competition cases. Of course, the CJEU is yet to see the impact 
of the reduced number of appeals filed to the GCEU as there is a delay of 2-3 years before the 
moment they are filed to the GCEU and the moment appeals against GCEU judgments are filed 
before the CJEU. Importantly, however, the CJEU must deal with several requests for preliminary 
ruling. The increased decentralisation of the enforcement of competition law combined with the 
growth in damages litigation, the number of preliminary rulings is likely to increase in the years 






                                                 
16  Judgment of 13 December 2016, Printeos v Commission, T-95/15, EU:T:2016:722, challenging the decision 
in case 39.780. The grounds were: an alleged infringement of the duty to state reasons regarding the adjustment 
of the basic amount of the fine, of the principle of equal treatment and of the principle of proportionality and 
non-discrimination, all in relation to the determination of the amount of the fine. Since the GC annulled the 
fine on the basis of the Commission's failure to state reasons, it did not go into the other two pleas. 
The second appeal had been withdrawn after the Commission had adjusted the fine for Société Générale. 
According to a short statement of the Commission, “[t]he amended fine is based on amended value of sales 
data provided by Société Générale in February 2016 after the bank realised that it had initially provided 
incorrect data to the Commission”. See Order of 2 March 2016, Société Générale v Commission, T-98/14, 
EU:T:2016:131, challenging the decision in case 39.914.  
17  Judgment of 13 December 2016 in Printeos e.a. v Commission, T-95/15, EU:T:2016:722, para. 51ff. 
18  Action brought on 14 April 2015 in Icap a.o. v Commission, T-180/15; Action brought on 3 August 2016 in 
Pometon v Commission, T-433/16; Action brought on 20 Feburary 2017 in Crédit Agricole and Crédit Agricole 
Corporate and Investment Bank v Commission, T-113/17 and Judgment of 20 May 2015, Timab Industries, T-






Source: Annual reports of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
 
B. Impact of the extensive use of commitments and settlement decisions on 
competition law enforcement 
In this Section, we explore the possible adverse consequences of an extensive use of commitments 
and settlement decisions on competition law enforcement.  
1. Commitments 
The alleged infringements that have been so far subject to the commitments decision, include 
horizontal cooperation agreements,19 vertical agreements20 and abuse of a dominant position.21 
 
a. Use of commitments in Article 101 TFEU cases 
 
An analysis of the commitments decisions adopted in the context of alleged breaches of Article 
101 TFEU suggests that the commitments procedure may have been used by the Commission to 
broaden the scope of restrictions by object without a proper check by the EU courts. In its first 
commitments decisions, the Commission appeared to refrain from identifying the behaviour in 
question as a possible restriction by object or effect – at least explicitly. As the number of 
                                                 
19  In the context of horizontal cooperation agreements, the cases addressed i.a. joint selling agreements, collective 
management of rights, alliances, standard-setting, joint setting of MIFs and various types of information 
exchange, such as through hub-and-spoke collusion, JVs and signaling. 
20  Vertical agreements consisted of non-compete clauses, refusing access to technical information and geo-
blocking. 
21  The type of alleged abuses of dominance were exclusionary and/or exploitative, such as rebates, tying and 














commitments decisions grew, the Commission became bolder and classified the behaviour as 
possible restrictions by object and/or effect22 or as restrictions by object.23  
 
One of the consequences of a broad interpretation of restriction by object is that it allows the 
Commission to do away with an effect-based analysis of the agreement in question. This may be 
especially problematic in cases where pro-competitive effects cannot be excluded or where the 
assessment of the agreement is rather complex or novel. For example, in the e-books case,24 the 
Commission was concerned that the joint switch by five international publishers from a wholesale 
model for the sale of e-books to an agency model containing the same key terms for retail prices, 
was part of a concerted practice between these publishers and Apple. According to the 
Commission, the publishers engaged in direct and indirect (through Apple) contact to jointly adopt 
a contract model that would enable them to either raise retail prices of e-books or to prevent the 
emergence of lower prices for e-books as a response to Amazon’s sharp pricing policy. However, 
this so-called “hub-and-spoke” conspiracy, where horizontal collusion is made possible through 
vertical agreements, is a complex concept. The assessment of hub-and-spoke practices has proved 
challenging and would benefit from further guidance to help undertakings to identify when their 
behaviour amounts to an infringement.25 The Commission has acknowledged that information 
exchanged indirectly between competitors through a common third-party may constitute a 
horizontal infringement,26 and the use of a supplier as a common point of reference by competing 
distributors in the context of a vertical  agreement may facilitate collusion,27 but it has not yet 
provided further guidance as to how such practice should be assessed. The succinct analysis 
comprised in a commitments decision does not assist much. 
 
b. Application of Article 102 TFEU 
 
The application of Article 102 TFEU typically raises complex legal and economic questions. 
Although the Commission may want to obtain an early closure of the investigation through the 
adoption of commitments meeting its competition concerns, in some cases, the need for guidance 
                                                 
22  See i.a. the Cannes Extension Agreement decision, the BA/AA/IB decision, the Visa I and Visa II decision, the 
A++ decision, the SkyTeam decision. 
23  See i.a. the Paramount decision, the Container Liner Shipping decision, the e-books decisions, the 
Siemens/Areva decision. 
24  See the e-books I decision. 
25  See O. Odudu, “Indirect Information Exchange: The Constituent Elements of Hub and Spoke Collusion”, 
(2011) 7(2) European Competition Journal 205-242. 
26  Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to 
horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ [2011] C11/1, para. 55. 
27  Commission notice - Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ [2010] C130/1, para. 211. 
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and/or evolution of the case-law should, in our view, prevail.28 This is especially true where the 
behaviour relates to unchartered areas of Article 102 TFEU.  
 
For example, almost all the investigations launched by the Commission in the energy sector ended 
with commitments decisions,29 leaving the industry with little if any guidance, while arguably 
extending the scope of Article 102 TFEU with far-reaching implications for the undertakings 
concerned. The E.ON electricity and ENI cases illustrate the Commission’s willingness to apply 
and interpret principles of abuse of dominance in an extensive and controversial manner.30 In the 
ENI case, the Commission considered that ENI may have committed an abuse of its dominant 
position on the gas transport markets by refusing to grant competitors access to capacity available 
on the network by granting access in an impractical manner and by strategically limiting 
investment in ENI’s international transmission pipeline system. While the refusal by a dominant 
firm to grant access to an essential infrastructure is an issue that has been subject to several EU 
courts’ judgments, whether strategically underinvesting in one’s infrastructure can be considered 
abusive is to say the least a controversial issue that would have benefited from guidance from the 
Commission and the EU courts. In the E.ON electricity case, the Commission also wanted to apply 
Article 102 TFEU to E.ON’s withholding of available capacity, i.e. its deliberate failure to offer 
for sale the production of certain power stations which was available and economically rationale, 
with a view to raising electricity prices to the detriment of consumers. Whether this behaviour was 
abusive and, if so, what was the nature of the abuse are controversial issues, which once again 
would have benefited from a full analysis from the Commission and, in case of confirmed 
infringement, a decision reviewed by the EU courts.  
 
c. Commission’s discretion 
 
One of the concerns that is most frequently voiced with respect to commitments is the potential 
that they may be used by the Commission as a regulatory approach, going beyond the “mere” 
enforcement of competition law.31 In other words, the Commission may be tempted to use this 
                                                 
28  For instance, since 2004, almost all abuse of dominance investigations ended with commitments decisions. 
29  In the energy sector, the Commission took 11 commitments decisions (cases 37.966, Distrigaz; 39.388 and 
39.389; German Electricity Wholesale Markets and German Electricity Balancing Markets; 39.402, RWE Gas 
Foreclosure; 39.116, Gaz de France; 39.386, Long-Term Contracts France; 39.951, Swedish Interconnectors; 
39.317, E.ON Gas; 39.315, ENI, 39.767, BEH Electricity, 39.315, ENI, 39.727, CEZ). The exceptions are Cases 
38.700, Greek lignite and electricity markets (although this was an Article 102 and 106 TFEU case) and 39.984, 
Romanian Power Exchange/OPCOM. 
30  In the E.ON electricity cases, the commitments were of a structural nature and consisted of the divesture of 
generation capacity by divesting (shares and rights in) certain power plants and the divestiture of transmission 
network. In the ENI case, the commitments were also of a structural nature and consisted of the divestiture of 
its shareholdings undertakings related to international gas transmission pipelines. 




procedure to impose remedies going beyond what could realistically be achieved through formal 
infringement decisions.32 This creates a risk that competition law could be instrumentalized to, for 
instance, meet the objectives of sector-specific regulation.33 Because appeals against commitments 
decisions are rare, there is a loss of control by the EU courts, increasing the broad margin of 
discretion of the Commission.  
 
For instance, the Commission has been criticized for using its commitments procedure as an 
instrument to enforce its energy liberalisation policy.34 Specifically, the Commission was criticized 
for resorting to the commitments procedure for aspects on which it had not been able to persuade 
Member States to support its legislative proposals.35 For example, during the negotiations on the 
Third Energy Package to liberalize the energy markets36, Germany was a strong opponent of 
“ownership unbundling” as a regulatory instrument to achieve liberalisation.37 Ownership 
unbundling would have imposed on integrated energy undertakings (such as E.ON) to separate 
their production and transmission activities through divestiture of the transmission network.38 As 
a compromise39, the Commission made ownership unbundling optional for the Member States.40 
However, even though Germany opted-out from the ownership unbundling option, the 
Commission used the commitments procedure41 to individually “negotiate” with E.ON the 
                                                 
32  P. Choné, S. Souam and A. Vialfont, “On the optimal use of commitments decisions under European 
competition law”, 33, available at 
www.crest.fr/ckfinder/userfiles/files/Pageperso/Chone/Commitments%20in%20Antitrust_IRLE_ReSub2_Ve
rsion2.pdf. 
33  P. Ibáñez Colomo, “On the application of competition law as regulation: elements for a theory” in P. Eeckhout 
and T. Tridimas (eds.), Yearbook of European Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, 276-277. 
34  M. Sadowska, “Energy liberalization: excessive pricing actions dusted off?”, (2011) 5 International Energy 
Law Review 228. 
35  Id., 231. 
36  Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common 
rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, OJ [2009] L211/55 and 
Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common 
rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC, OJ [2009] L211/94. For more, 
see http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/markets-and-consumers/market-legislation. 
37  “E.ON surprise grid offer bolsters EU liberalisation hopes”, Euractiv, 29 February 2008, available at 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/e-on-surprise-grid-offer-bolsters-eu-liberalisation-hopes/. 
38  “Questions and Answers on the third legislative package for an internal EU gas and electricity market”, 
MEMO/11/125, 2 March 2011, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-
125_en.htm?locale=en. 
39  “EU strikes deal on energy market liberalization”, Euractiv, 25 March 2009, available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/eu-strikes-deal-on-energy-market-liberalisation/. 
40  The other two unbundling models consisted of the Independent System Operator (where the undertaking can 
still own the physical network, but has to leave the entire operation, maintenance and investment to an 
independent company) and the Independent Transmission System Operator (where the undertaking can own 
and operate the network, but the management must be done by a subsidiary). 
41  See the E.ON electricity cases. 
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divestiture by E.ON of power plants and its transmission network, thereby ensuring “ownership 
unbundling” in Germany.42  
 
Another example is the e-commerce sector, where the Commission’s approach was arguably 
regulatory in nature. For instance, in the Paramount case, certain respondents to the market test 
notice claimed that  
 
“if the Commission were to make binding the commitments offered by Paramount, this 
would constitute a misuse of power. Any change that the commitments offered by 
Paramount would bring about should be achieved through a review of EU copyright law 
rather than a decision pursuant to Article 9.”43  
 
The Commission rejected this claim by stating that a  
 
“measure may amount to a misuse of powers only if it appears, on the basis of objective, 
relevant and consistent factors, to have been taken with the exclusive purpose, or at any 
rate the main purpose, of achieving an end other than that stated or evading a procedure 
specifically prescribed by the Treaty for dealing with the circumstances of the case.”44 
 
These examples are a clear reminder that the role of competition authorities is not to regulate a 
sector or create a level playing field, but to prohibit breaches of competition rules and adopt 
(infringement decision) or accept (commitments decision) remedies that directly address the 
specific competition concerns it has identified. 
 
2. Settlements 
The underlying restrictive agreements in the case of settlement decisions involved price fixing, 
market sharing and exchange of commercially-sensitive information.  
Based on the limited information provided by the Commission in its settlement decisions, these 
decisions included straightforward cases of price fixing in which the undertakings coordinated 
tender prices or responses to requests issued by customers,45 current and future (intended) prices,46 
                                                 
42  P. Chauve et.al., “The E.ON electricity cases: an antitrust decision with structural remedies”, (2009) 1 
Competition Policy Newsletter 54; R. Karova and M. Botta, “Sanctioning excessive energy prices as abuse of 
dominance – are the EU Commission and the National Competition Authorities on the same frequency?” in 
P.L. Parcu, G. Monti and M. Botta (eds.), Abuse of dominance in EU competition law. Emerging Trends, 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017, 175. 
43  The Paramount decision, para. 70. 
44  Id., para. 71. 
45  See e.g. the Alternator and starters decision, parking heaters decision, mushrooms decision, Automotive Wire 
Harnesses decision, Automotive bearings decision. 
46  See e.g. the Water Management decision. 
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and the passing-on of raw material price increases to the customers.47 These decisions also 
involved instances of indirect price fixing, such as the coordination of “gross list” price increases,48 
agreements on a uniform calculation model for a common surcharge,49 and a high degree of 
transparency at meetings with regard to trading conditions.50 Price fixing practices often occurred 
in combination with an exchange of commercially sensitive information, on prices, market 
strategies,51 and other trading conditions (e.g. stock levels, sales, customer developments, raw 
material costs and an estimation of the demand and sales, and monitoring mechanisms).52 
Settlement decisions also concerned market-sharing practices, such as the allocation of supply and 
customers, applying the “incumbent supplier principle”, which meant that they would not 
aggressively pursue individual customers or specific models supplied historically53 or respect 
quotas reflecting estimated historic market shares.54 
While judicial review is an important part of the evolution of a legal regime, the cartel case-law is 
highly developed and most appeals of Commission cartel decisions focus on the level of the fines 
rather than important competition law questions (with some exceptions, such as, for instance, 
parental liability issues). Nevertheless, the Commission may be tempted to use the settlement 
process to stretch the law beyond its original bounds, especially when the issue at stake is not a 
blatant price-fixing or market-sharing cartel, but exchanges of commercially-sensitive 
information.  
 
In any event, when the undertakings concerned and the Commission disagree on the facts or on 
the law principles, nothing prevents these undertakings (or some of them as hybrid settlements are 
possible) to step out of the settlement and return to the infringement procedure.55 The number of 
hybrid settlements suggest that undertakings do not hesitate to abandon settlement negotiations. In 
                                                 
47  See e.g. the Automotive bearings decision, Foam matresses decision. 
48  See e.g. the truck producers decision. 
49  See e.g. the Steel abrasives decision. 
50  See e.g. the CRT glass decision. 
51  See e.g. the Alternator and starter decision, parking heaters decision. 
52  See e.g. the Laundry power detergents decision, Refrigeration compressors decision, CRT glass decision, 
DRAM decision. 
53  See e.g. the Alternator and starters decision, parking heaters decision. 
54  See e.g. the Animal Feed Phosphates decision. 
55  Except perhaps for the (subjective) fear of getting “penalized” for stepping out of the settlement and receive, 
for instance, a higher fine. For example, in the DRAMs settlement case, Timab, the non-settling undertaking, 
challenged the decision after having received a significantly increased fine compared to the range of fine 
originally discussed in the settlement procedure, and claimed that it had been “penalized” for having withdrawn 
from the settlement procedure by a fine which is greater than that which they were entitled to expect. Judgment 
of 20 May 2015, Timab Industries, T-456/10, EU:T:2015:296. See also N. Lenoir and M. Truffier, “Timab 
Industries et al.: General Court’s Ruling on the First Hybrid Settlement Case”, (2016) 7(1) Journal of European 
Competition Law and Practice 24-25. 
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this respect, one of the risks of excessive reliance on cartel settlements is that, in the long-run, 
there is a risk that lawyers that are used to negotiate “deals” with the Commission forget that there 




Commitments and settlement decisions present significant advantages to both the Commission and 
investigated undertakings, which explains the popularity of these procedures. While we see few 
downsides in settling hard-core cartels as few of such cases raise novel questions, the application 
of the settlement or the commitments procedure to cases that raise such questions is more 
debatable. We are also concerned that on some occasions these procedures may be used to stretch 
the application of the law or even to regulate a sector. 
 
We finally note that in abuse of dominance cases, one of factors that has contributed to the 
willingness to offer commitments even when they considered they did not engage in any 
wrongdoing is the concern that, should the Commission adopt an infringement decision, their 
ability to have it overturned by the EU courts was slim given the unbroken series of victories of 
the Commission in appeals launched against its Article 102 TFEU decisions. Whether the recent 
judgment of the CJEU in the Intel case,56 which struck down the controversial judgement of the 
GCEU,57 will make more dominant firms more willing to fight alleged cases of abuses made by 





                                                 
56  Judgment of 6 September 2017, Intel Corp v Commission, C-413/14 P, EU:C:2017:632. 
57  Judgment of 12 June 2014, Intel Corp v Commission, T-286/09, EU:T:2014:547. 
